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The degree of international risk sharing matters for how monetary policy should optimally be conducted in an open 
economy. This is because risk sharing affects the way in which monetary policy is affected by terms of trade considerations. 
In a standard two-country model with monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities I consider different assumptions 
on international financial markets – complete markets, financial autarky and a bond economy – and a large region for the 
crucial parameter of the trade elasticity. There are three main results: one, the prescription of (producer) price stability as 
the optimal policy is obtained only as a special case, while in general it is optimal to deviate from a strictly zero inflation 
rate. Two, while gains from international policy coordination are generally small, they become potentially substantial when 
international risk sharing is poor and wealth effects from shocks across countries are large. And, three, when international 
financial markets are incomplete, there are also (sometimes considerable) gains over the flexible price allocation achievable.
JEL: E52, E58, F42.
Keywords: monetary policy, risk sharing, price stability, policy coordination, financial market structure, trade elasticity.
A nemzetközi kockázatmegosztás mértéke fontos meghatározója a nyitott gazdaságok optimális monetáris politikájának.   
A kockázatmegosztás foka ugyanis hat arra, hogy a monetáris politika miként veszi figyelembe a cserearány-megfontoláso-
kat. Egy sztenderd, kétországos modellben – monopolisztikus versenyt és ragadós árakat feltételezve – vizsgálom a nemzet-
közi tőkepiacra vonatkozó különböző lehetséges feltevéseket (teljes piacok, pénzügyi autarkia, illetve egyetlen kötvény 
esete), valamint a kereskedelmi rugalmasság paramétereink széles skáláját. A három fő eredmény a következő: (i) a terme-
lői árindex stabilizálása csak egy speciális esetben optimális, általában célszerű eltérni a szigorú inflációs célkövetéstől; (ii) 
a nemzetközi monetáris politikai kooperáció előnyei általában kicsik, kivéve alacsony nemzetközi kockázatmegosztás és 
erős országok közötti jövedelemhatások esetén; (iii) ha a nemzetközi tőkepiacok nem teljesek, a rugalmas árak melletti 
allokáció (néha jelentős mértékben) elmarad az optimálistól.
Abstract
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a unifying framework to study the role of the degree of international risk sharing for
optimal monetary policy in open economies. The main results are threefold: one, the prescription of (pro-
ducer) price stability as the optimal policy is obtained only as a special case, while in general it is optimal to
deviate from a strictly zero inﬂation rate. Two, while gains from international policy coordination are gen-
erally small, they become potentially substantial when international risk sharing is poor and wealth effects
from shocks across countries are large. And, three, when international ﬁnancial markets are incomplete,
there are also (sometimes considerable) gains over the ﬂexible price allocation achievable.
The framework used to address these issues is a relatively standard two-country imperfectly-competitive
sticky-price model of the open economy. In such a setup, a number of imperfections characterize the econ-
omy that typically exert inﬂuence on the way monetary policy should optimally be conducted. As in the
closed economy both countries are characterized by two internal distortions: because of monopolistic com-
petition output is inefﬁciently low, and the economy’s adjustment is subject to nominal rigidities in the form
of quadratic price adjustment costs (assumed to be set in producer currency), which opens up an output gap
relative to a world of ﬂexible prices.
In addition, there is an external distortion which stems from a country’s monopoly power on the relative
price of its exports to imports, that is, on its terms of trade (TOT).1 The present paper shows that this
international dimension of monetary policy, that is, the size and direction in which movements in the terms
of trade enter into the consideration of monetary policy, depends crucially on the degree of international
risk sharing.
The degree of risk sharing in turn, is determined by the structure of international ﬁnancial markets assumed,
as well as by the precise parameterization of the trade elasticity. For this purpose, I contrast three stylized
assumptions on the international ﬁnancial market structure — namely, complete markets (CM), ﬁnancial
autarky (FA) and an incomplete markets-bond economy (IM) — and consider a wide range of the trade
elasticity. The latter is of importance as it governs the strength in which relative wealth is affected in response
tocountryspeciﬁcshocks. Inthespecialcaseofaunitaryelasticity(combinedwithlog-utility)movementsin
thetermsoftradeprovidefullautomaticrisksharingindependentoftheﬁnancialmarketstructureassumed.2
An analysis of the role of the degree of risk sharing for optimal monetary policy can therefore only be
addressed at values of the elasticity away from unity. In the previous literature there has been no consensus
on the choice of the value of the trade elasticity — it has been all over the place. Therefore, I choose not to
calibrate this parameter to a speciﬁc ﬁxed value, but consider instead a large range for it, where domestic and
foreign consumption goods are allowed to be either substitutes or complements. Moreover, I consider also
very low elasticities in my analysis which have been shown to be necessary to reproduce — together with an
incomplete ﬁnancial market structure — the empirically observed low degrees of international risk sharing.
I study optimal monetary policy using a Ramsey approach and assuming that policymakers can commit.
Gains from international policy coordination are computed by contrasting welfare achieved by a world social
planner with the welfare achieved under uncoordinated (Nash) policy competition. On the methodological
side, the present paper contributes to the literature by laying out a well deﬁned Nash policy game in a
dynamic economy in the framework of the Ramsey approach. In the following, I brieﬂy discuss each of the
three results found and position and contrast them with respect to the literature.
Turning to the ﬁrst result in more detail, I ﬁnd that for almost all cases of ﬁnancial market assumptions and
policy regimes considered the implications are that full stabilization is not the optimal monetary policy. By
1 Throughout the paper, I refer to the terms of trade when talking about the inﬂuence of international prices on policy decisions. However, it should
be noted that, equivalently, I could have referred to the real exchange rate as the relevant international price to consider (which in this model always
moves proportionally to the terms of trade).
2 In this case any income effects from shocks are offset by proportional movements in the international relative price (see, Cole & Obstfeld (1991),
Corsetti & Pesenti (2001)).
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full stabilization I refer to a policy of achieving fully stable producer prices, such that the terms of trade
behave exactly as in the world without nominal rigidities and the ﬂexible price allocation is replicated (fully
closing the output gap). Only in the case of complete markets under coordination and in the case of the
unit-elasticity-’automatic perfect risk sharing’ producer prices should be kept fully stabilized.3 Moreover, I
document the precise patterns when it is optimal to fully stabilize, understabilize or overstabilize the econ-
omy. An interesting result is that the optimal policy is found to be exactly the opposite under CM and FA:
when it is optimal for an independently acting policymaker to understabilize the economy under CM (full
risk sharing), he ﬁnds it optimal to overstabilize the economy under FA (no risk sharing).4 In a recent con-
tribution De Paoli (2009) documents a related result. She studies the role of ﬁnancial market structure on
optimal monetary policy in a small open economy in the form of comparing different targeting rules and
ﬁnds that the welfare based ranking of these rules is in opposite order for the case of CM and FA.5
In particular, the above result can be understood as follows: let us consider a temporary domestic produc-
tivity increase as an example. Also, consider that domestic and foreign goods can easily be substituted in
consumption. In response to the shock, an independently acting policymaker under CM ﬁnds it optimal
to somewhat understabilize the economy. That is, while he lowers the interest rate to make output supply
determined he does so not to the full degree to replicate the ﬂexible price allocation and leaves a small output
gap open. This also means that the resulting terms of trade depreciation is somewhat less pronounced and
the policymaker enjoys a more favorable relative price compared to the ﬂexible price world. By expanding
output a little less he can reduce his labor effort at the prospect of keeping his utility from consumption —
as perfect international risk sharing holds and goods can easily be substituted.6 The situation is a different
when countries are in ﬁnancial autarky. In such a setup the policymaker ﬁnds it optimal to initiate an output
increase that more that closes the output gap and that depreciates the terms of trade even more that under
ﬂexible prices, that is, he overstabilizes the economy. He does so because under FA output and consumption
are very closely linked, so even though labor effort has to be increased, this is worth it as consumption can
be raised as well.
Furthermore, eventhecoordinatedpolicymaker under FAwill follow thispolicy, in fact, will initiatean even
larger terms of trade depreciation. This is because the policymaker under FA, coordinated or uncoordinated,
has to consider an additional distortion in his design of monetary policy, the fact that the degree of risk
sharing is too low and can be improved through a larger adjustment in international relative prices.
A second result is the dependence of welfare gains from policy coordination on the degree of risk sharing.
The two-country setup allows for an explicit consideration of Nash versus coordinated optimal policies,
which allows to also draw conclusions about the gains from policy cooperation. These are found increasing
for elasticities of substitution away from unity and are typically an order of magnitude larger in the case of
complementarity between domestic and foreign goods, particularly when risk sharing is low (FA and IM).
In addition, I ﬁnd that welfare gains from coordination are bigger under complete markets when goods are
substitutes, but turn out to be bigger under ﬁnancial autarky/ incomplete markets when goods are comple-
ments. This is due to the fact that the lack of risk sharing becomes even more important when, because of
a low elasticity, international prices move strongly and wealth effects are large. Sutherland (2004) has pre-
viously studied the role of market structure for the gains of policy coordination in a simple static model,
ﬁnding that welfare gains are rather small. In addition he only considers the case when goods are substitutes.
On the one hand welfare gains are likely to be larger under more realistic, dynamic price rigidities7, on the
other hand the case of low substitution elasticities is of particular interest as it is precisely the speciﬁcation
3 This is the ’isomorphism’ and ’inward-looking’ result of early contributions (see, e.g., Clarida et al. (2001), Galí & Monacelli (2005), or Corsetti & Pesenti
(2001), Benigno & Benigno (2003)).
4 This ﬁnding is summarized graphically in Figure 2, which plots the impact responses (to a productivity shock) of producer price inﬂation as a function
of the trade elasticity.
5 The simple rules she considers are producer price inﬂation targeting, consumer price inﬂation targeting, and a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
6 Under Nash policy competition, however, both countries behave in this fashion and the too low terms of trade volatility does no longer provide full risk
sharing, leading to welfare losses.
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needed to reconcile the predictions of the theoretical model with the low degree of risk sharing observed in
the data.
It is interesting to note, that even if policymakers act coordinately price stability is, in general, not found to
be the optimal outcome. The reason for this ﬁnding is that the ﬂexible price ﬁnancial autarky economy (or
bond economy) is not efﬁcient as countries do not involve in any (too little) risk sharing. A policymaker
that can, because of sticky prices, inﬂuence the terms of trade/ the real exchange rate ﬁnds it optimal to let
it respond more closely to the way it would under complete ﬁnancial markets, such that the equilibrium
responses of the real exchange rate under the optimal policy is also doing some risk sharing. 8 This desire to
improve international risk sharing can be very strong, such that even in the Nash case, welfare gains over the
ﬂexible price allocation can be made, when ﬁnancial markets are incomplete.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, section 3 discusses the role
of monetary policy in a world with various degrees of international risk sharing and sets up the relevant
Ramsey problems. Section 2 discusses the model’s parameterization. Section 5 discusses the results for
optimal monetary policy depending on the degree of intratemporal elasticity and depending on the ﬁnancial
market structure, looking at the implications for the optimality of price stability and the gains from policy
coordination. Section 6 concludes.
7 Faia & Monacelli (2004) also study the role of the terms of trade on optimal policy in a model with Rotemberg adjustment costs, but only consider the
case of complete markets.
8 A related point is made recently by Corsetti et al. (2009).
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2 The Model
The world economy consists of a Home country (H) and a Foreign country (F), each of which is specialized
in the production of one type of tradable good. Households and ﬁrms are deﬁned over a continuum of unit
mass. Home and Foreign households are indexed by j ε [0,1] and j∗ ε [0,1] respectively. Each good is
produced by ﬁrms in a number of varieties, indexed by h in the Home country and by f in the Foreign
country. Each variety is an imperfect substitute to all other varieties and is produced under conditions
of monopolistic competition. Firms face quadratic adjustment costs in their price setting decision and are
assumed to set the price in the foreign market in their own currency (producer currency pricing). I abstract
from modeling monetary frictions by considering a cashless economy. Unless necessary otherwise, in the
following I only discuss the problem of Home agents, with an understanding that the problem for Foreign
agents is symmetric — variables of Foreign agents are marked with an asterisk.
HOUSEHOLDS
Preferences and Budget Constraint


























where β is the discount factor, C (j) is consumption and L(j) is labor effort. Consumption C (j) is a

















whereω denotesthetradeelasticity, thatis, theintratemporalelasticityofsubstitutionbetweendomesticand
foreign goods, and where parameter γ ≥ 1
2 is the degree of home bias in consumption. For each household j






























where Ct (h, j) and Ct (f , j) are respectively consumption of Home variety h and Foreign variety f by agent
j at time t.
Household j maximizes equation (1) subject to the budget constraint. Each period household j receives
wage income, WtLt (j), and dividends from the monopolistic ﬁrms they own, Πt (j), and has consumption
expenditure PtCt (j). The availability of any assets of domestic household j depends on the assumptions of
the structure of international ﬁnancial markets. Throughout the paper, I consider three possible scenarios:
complete markets (CM), ﬁnancial autarky (FA) and an incomplete markets bond economy (IM).
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+WtLt (j)+Πt (j)−PtCt (j).
If the two economies are in ﬁnancial autarky no assets can be traded internationally. Let BH,t (j) and BF,t (j)
denote bonds denominated in either domestic and foreign currency. Under international ﬁnancial autarky,
the domestic currency bond, BH,t, that can be traded only domestically. Equivalently, foreign agents can
trade a foreign currency bond, B∗
F,t, but also only within their country.9 The budget constraint of domestic
household j under ﬁnancial autarky then becomes:
BH,t (j) = BH,t−1(j)Rt−1 +WtLt (j)+Πt (j)−PtCt (j). (5)
Finally, I consider the case of the incomplete markets-bond economy. I now assume that both countries can
now engage in ﬁnancial trade through one of the one-period nominal bonds. In particular, I assume that
the foreign currency denominated bond, BF,t, can be traded internationally (and net foreign wealth is ini-
tially zero).10 While this assumption introducing a small asymmetry into the otherwise symmetric setup,
I do so because the domestic and foreign currency bond holdings are not separately identiﬁed.11 Following
Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2003) and Benigno (2001), to render the incomplete markets economy stationary, I
assume that domestic agents face a quadratic adjustment cost when taking on an international asset position











t−1 +WtLt (j)+Πt (j)−PtCt (j).
9 That is, the asset market clearing conditions under FA are
1 ￿
0




F,t (j∗)d j∗ = 0.
10 The nominal bonds are in zero net-supply worldwide, so that:
1 ￿
0
BH,t (j)d j = 0 and
1 ￿
0




F,t (j∗)d j∗ = 0
11 Moreover, it is important to note that the internationally traded asset is exogenously restricted to be the foreign currency bond only, for which a long-run
zero position is simply assumed. In particular, this setup does not enter the recent literature on issues of portfolio choice and endogenous non-zero
positions (see, e.g. Devereux & Sutherland (2008) and Tille & van Wincoop (2007)).
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Households’ Intratemporal Consumption Allocation
Household j minimizes, each period, its consumption expenditure subject to obtaining a unit of the ﬁnal
consumption good. Denoting with Pt the Lagrange multiplier to that problem12 gives the following optimal
demand functions:






























































Households’ Labor Supply and Intertemporal Allocation
Denote with λt (j) the Lagrange multiplier of the household’s budget constraint. Household j’s ﬁrst order





t (j) =Wt. (11)









































pt (h)Ct (h, j)dh +
1 ￿
0
pt (f )Ct (f , j)d f −PtCt (j).
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The nominal interest rate Rt and R∗
t can be thought of as the underlying instruments of monetary policy in
the two economies.
FIRMS
Production and Price Setting
The production function is assumed to be linear in labor:
Yt (h) = ZtLt (h), (16)
where Zt is the level of productivity, which is given by a country-speciﬁc AR(1) process with persistence
parameter ρZ and standard deviation σZ. Firms operate under conditions of monopolistic competition tak-
ing into account the downward-sloping demand for their product and set prices to maximize their proﬁt.
They are assumed to set the prices in the foreign market in their own currency, that is, I consider the sce-
nario of producer currency pricing (PCP). Firms are small, in the sense that they ignore the impact of their
pricing and production decisions on aggregate variables and price indices. When ﬁrms set their prices they











The presence of Rotemberg adjustment costs makes the ﬁrms’ price setting decision dynamic, which intro-
duces richer and arguably more realistic equilibrium dynamic effects of monetary policy than in a setup
where prices are set one period in advance. The richer description of price stickiness is also likely to be more
appropriate for quantitative welfare analysis. I assume throughout that the law of one price holds, such that
for each variety h we have ￿t p∗
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where MCt is the marginal cost that minimizes labor input, which is equal to all ﬁrms, MCt (h) = MCt =
Wt/Zt, Ωt,s is the household’s stochastic discount factor between time t and s, and where τ stands for a
production subsidy that can be used to offset the distortion from monopolistic competition.
Firms’ Optimality Conditions











































Parameterα = 0correspondstothecaseofﬂexibleprices, inwhichcasetheprice issetastheasimplemarkup
over current marginal costs.
I focus attention on a symmetric equilibrium where all domestic producers charge the same price, adopt the
same technology and therefore choose the same demand for labor. This implies pt (h) = PH,t, p∗
t (h) = P∗
H,t,
Lt (h) = Lt, Πt (j) = Πt.
RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND AGGREGATE BUDGET CONSTRAINTS




ct(h, j)d j +
1 ￿
0
ct(h, j∗)d j∗ +
1 ￿
0
φt (j)d j = CH,t +C∗
H,t +φt, (20)
Y ∗
t (f ) =
1 ￿
0
ct(f , j)d j +
1 ￿
0




t (j∗)d j∗ = CF,t +C∗
F,t +φ∗
t. (21)
Symmetry across all households j gives Ct (j) = Ct, Lt (j) = Lt, λt (j) = λt, and implies that conditions
(7)-(8), (11)-(13), (14) and (15) must also hold for aggregate variables and indices j can be dropped.
In addition, using equilibrium in the asset markets the aggregate budget constraint under the case of ﬁnancial
autarky, having imposed clearing conditions, can be expressed as:
0=WtLt +Πt −PtCt. (22)










t−1 +WtLt +Πt −PtCt. (23)
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RELATIVE PRICES AND THE TERMS OF TRADE










Using the optimal consumer price level resulting from the intratemporal allocation problem, it is possible to
express all relative prices as a function of the terms of trade only. In particular, the real exchange rate, which




/Pt, is related to the terms of trade by:















The PPI-to-CPI ratios are deﬁned as pH,t ≡ PH,t/Pt and p∗
F,t ≡ P∗
F,t/P∗
t and can also be written as functions
of the terms of trade only:
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3 Optimal Monetary Policy and International Risk
Sharing
Having completed the description of the model economy, I now turn to studying the optimal monetary pol-
icy in this two-country imperfectly competitive sticky price economy. The particular focus will lie on how
the degree of international risk sharing affects the scope and goals of monetary policy and if the predictions
for optimal monetary policy in this otherwise standard model are altered.
For this reason, it is useful to ﬁrst reﬂect on the distortions that characterize the economy. As in the closed
economy both countries are characterized by two internal distortions: price stickiness and monopolistic
competition.Thelatterproducesaninefﬁcientlevelofoutput. Theotherinternaldistortion, pricestickiness,
prevents efﬁcient adjustment to the disturbances that affect the economy and opens up a gap of output
relative to the ﬂexible price allocation. The consensus result of the literature is that a procyclical policy can
remove the sticky-price distortion by making production supply-determined and can restore the ﬂex-price
equilibrium if desirable.
In addition to the two internal distortions, there is an external distortion which stems from countries’
monopoly power on the international relative price, that is, on their terms of trade. The strength and di-
rection in which terms of trade considerations enter monetary policy crucially depends on the amount of
international risk sharing, which in turn depends on a) the assumptions on asset markets and b) the degree
of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. In order to study this external dimension of mon-
etary policy, that is, the role of the monopoly power over the terms of trade for monetary policy I follow
Sutherland (2004) and Benigno (2009) in considering a setup in which the presence of a production subsidy
fully offsets the distortion from monopolistic competition. This allows me to isolate the inﬂuence of terms
of trade considerations for the conduct of monetary policy.13
In the setup of complete ﬁnancial markets, a policymaker therefore only faces the distortion of sticky prices
andthefactthathehasmonopolypoweroverthetermsoftrade. Whileacoordinatedpolicymakerfullytakes
into account the effect of movements in the terms of trade on world welfare, a non-coordinated policymaker
will seek to use his monopoly power to maximize his own country’s welfare, ignoring the effect of such a
strategy on the other country.
Under incomplete markets (FA or IM) policymakers also face a situation in which the degree of international
risk sharing is too low. Therefore a coordinated policymaker will aim at using his instrument, on the one
hand, as before, to make demand supply-determined, on the other hand, to try to improve international
risk sharing. A non-coordinated policymaker’s terms of trade considerations are now inﬂuenced by both his
desire to tilt the terms of trade in his favor, but also by improving risk sharing properties to some degree.
For all ﬁnancial market assumptions considered, the single most important parameter that inﬂuences both
size and direction of terms of trade considerations is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods, the trade elasticity. It determines the strength of expenditure switching effects of
the exchange rate/ terms of trade and therefore the impact of monetary policy on goods demand in different
countries. It also inﬂuences the degree to which countries are subject to asymmetric income shocks. If the
elasticity is close to unity then relative price changes are largely offset by changes in output volumes and the
terms of trade provide strong automatic risk sharing (see Cole & Obstfeld (1991)).
I assume throughout that policymakers can credibly commit in the sense that they can choose the entire
future (state-contingent) evolution of the control variables, once and for all, at date zero. The assumption
of commitment is important, as private sector expectations about the evolution of prices affect the forward
13 Sensitivity analysis will be conducted in section 5 and will allow for a relaxation of this simplifying assumption.
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looking terms in the dynamic pricing equations. I study these issues by employing a Ramsey type approach,
following closely the steps outlined inSchmitt-Grohé & Uribe(2009) to obtain the steady state and dynamics
implied by the Ramsey equilibrium.14 In this setup the optimal monetary policy entails a Ramsey planner
which maximizes a social objective function subject to the private sector’s constraints.15 I compare opti-
mal commitment policy under Nash competition and under cooperation, and compute welfare gains from
coordination from a second order approximation to the Ramsey equilibrium equations.
DEFINITION OF EQUILIBRIUM AND DESCRIPTION OF CONSTRAINTS FOR RAMSEY
PROBLEM
An equilibrium requires that households and ﬁrms behave optimally, as described by the above optimality
conditions. Speciﬁcally, given exogenous processes for Zt and Z∗
t , a policy for Rt and R∗
t and given initial
conditions, a symmetric world competitive equilibrium is a set of prices and quantities that
• satisfy the Home and Foreign consumers’ optimality conditions, equations (7)-(11), and their foreign
counterparts, together with:
– the risk sharing equation (13) under complete ﬁnancial markets
– equation (14) and the budget constraint, equation (23), under the incomplete markets-bond econ-
omy
– the budget constraint, equation (22), under the ﬁnancial autarky
• maximize ﬁrms proﬁts, meaning that prices are set according to (19) and similarly in the foreign econ-
omy,
• satisfy the market clearing conditions for each asset and each good, in all the markets where it is traded,
and
• satisfy the resource constraints.
It is possible to reduce the system of equilibrium conditions to a system of equations in Ct, C∗




t ,andforapolicyfor Rt and R∗
t. Inparticular,












rate and the terms of trade (equation (25)) and the PPI-to-CPI ratio and the terms of trade (equation (26)),
it is possible to write the equilibrium as being described by equations (27)-(33) below. Equations (27)-(28)
are the two Euler equations, equations (29)-(30) the two price setting equations, equations (31)-(32) the two
resourceconstraints, andequations(33a), (33b)or(33c)aretherelevantoptimalityconditionsthatholdunder











14 This builds on previous work on the study of optimal policy in dynamic economies, see e.g., (Ramsey (1927)), Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976),
Lucas & Stokey (1983), Chari et al. (1991).
15 While most studies of optimal monetary policy in the recent literature build on a linear-quadratic approximation approach in the spirit of
Rotemberg & Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003), and Benigno & Woodford (2005), recently, the Ramsey type approach has been employed in an
increasing number of dynamic equilibrium models with monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. Examples include, among others, Khan et al.
(2003), Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2005, 2007), and Faia & Monacelli (2004).
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−φt = Ct, (33b)


































16 The budget constraint is also expressed in real terms, where bF,t = BF,t/P∗
t .
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OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RISK SHARING
DEFINITION OF RAMSEY PROBLEM UNDER COOPERATION
To derive the Ramsey optimal monetary policy under cooperation, I set up the problem of a world social
planner that aims at maximizing the country-size weighted average measure of welfare, which are given by





















Let i = CM,FA,IM denote the three assumptions on ﬁnancial market structure. Deﬁne the vector of Ram-
sey constraints as RC i
t , by vertically stacking equilibrium equations (27)-(33). Also, let superscript ￿C￿ refer
to the case of policymakers acting under coordination. I deﬁne the vector of Lagrange multipliers at time
t attached to constraints (27)-(33) by Λi,C
















this dynamic economy it is not possible to solve in closed form the decentralized economy as a function of
policy instruments only. Different from Chari & Kehoe (1999) the Ramsey problem is therefore set up by
carrying the model’s equilibrium conditions as constraints, that implicitly deﬁne the economy’s allocation
as a functions of the instruments, Rt and R∗
t. In particular, following Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2009), I ﬁnd
the portion of the Ramsey problem that is relevant for the purpose of computing the optimal policy from


















































DEFINITION OF RAMSEY PROBLEM UNDER INDEPENDENTLY ACTING MONETARY
AUTHORITIES
Ifmonetaryauthoritiesactuncoordinated, thehomeandforeignpolicymakereachmaximizetheirrespective
national welfare, taking as given the other country’s choice of policy, that is, either interest rate Rt or R∗
t. In






















A Nash equilibrium is deﬁned as a situation in which both countries choose the level of consumption, labor
and inﬂation, and the policy instrument to maximize their objective, but where the other country’s con-
sumption, labor and inﬂation depend themselves on the policy choice of the ﬁrst (not simply taken as given).
17 As the incomplete markets-bond economy the the vector of constraints includes two ﬁnancial market speciﬁc equations and the size of Lagrange
multipliers is accordingly enlarged.
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As such, the home Ramsey policymaker should take as constraints its own Euler equation, pricing equation
and resource constraint and ﬁnancial market equilibrium condition as the relevant Ramsey constraints, plus
the foreign consumption, labor and inﬂation choices as a function of its choice of the policy instrument. But
these are nothing else than implicit functions deﬁned by the foreign Euler equation, pricing equation and
resource constraint. Therefore, each policymaker takes the entire competitive equilibrium conditions, given
by equations (27)-(32) and the relevant ﬁnancial market equilibrium equation, equation (33a), (33b) or (33c),
as constraints to the Ramsey policy problem.18
The vector of constraints for the domestic and the foreign authority is given, as under coordination, by RC i
t

































4,t ], where superscript ￿N￿refers to the scenario of complete markets and Nash policymakers. The
relevant portions of the Ramsey problems of the Lagrangians of the optimal policy problem of the domestic















































Taking derivatives of Li,N with respect to Λi,N
t , and Ct,C∗
t ,Lt,L∗
t,πH,t,π∗
F,t,TOTt, and Rt summarizes the
optimal policy of the domestic monetary authority, conditional on a foreign policy R∗
t. Equivalently, the
derivatives of L∗i,N with respect to Λ∗i,N




t summarize the opti-
mal policy of the foreign monetary authority, conditional on domestic policy Rt. The full Nash equilibrium
can then be obtained by combining the Ramsey optimality conditions of the domestic and foreign policy-
makers (it should be noted, that the ﬁrst order condition w.r.t. the vector of Lagrange multipliers of both
policymakers are identical, that is, they simply return the equations of the competitive equilibrium).19
18 This is in contrast to Faia & Monacelli (2004) and Liu & Pappa (2008) who take the each country’s own optimality conditions as a constraints in the
uncoordinated Ramsey problem (taking as given the other country’s consumption, labor and inﬂation choices in addition to the policy instrument).
19 As in the case of coordination, the incomplete markets bond economy consists of two ﬁnancial market related equilibrium conditions, and the vectors
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4 Parameterization
The baseline parameterization of the model is summarized in Table 1, in section 5 I consider some parameter
variations. The discount factor β is taken to be 0.99, implying an annual interest rate of about 4 percent.
Parameter θ is taken to be 6, which implies a markup over marginal cost of about 20 percent. Parameter
γ (γ∗), which is the weight on domestic good in the domestic (foreign) consumption basket, is set to 0.75
(0.25) in the baseline case, implying that there is positive home bias. The value of the parameter of the
quadratic adjustment cost in price setting, α, is 60, which corresponds, together with the chosen value for
θ, to a parameter of about 0.75 in a Calvo style price setting or a price stickiness of about four quarters,
based on the slope coefﬁcient in the linearized pricing equations (see, e.g. Faia & Monacelli (2008)). The
degree of risk aversion, σ, is considered to be 1 in the baseline parameterization (which implies log utility
in consumption). The inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, κ, is equal to 2, a value that lies well in the
region used in the literature (e.g. Rotemberg & Woodford (1997) suggest a value of 0.47, while micro data on
(low) estimated Frisch elasticities suggest values as high as 5, which is chosen e.g. by Benigno (2009). The
production subsidy parameter is set such that it offsets the monopolistic competition distortion, that is, τ,
is set equal to 1/(θ−1). As for the exogenous processes, I consider, in line with most of the international
business cycle literature, a rather persistent technology shock with autocorrelation coefﬁcient of ρ∗ = 0.95,
and with standard deviation of the shock of σ￿, σ∗
￿ = 0.01.
Finally, I consider a wide range for the value of the trade elasticity, ranging from goods being very com-
plementary in consumption to goods being very substitutable. As I show, the value of the trade elasticity
is a most crucial parameter in determining the inﬂuence of terms of trade considerations in shaping opti-
mal monetary policy in an open economy. Also, there is no consensus on the choice for this parameter in
the literature. In the trade literature, Lai & Treﬂer (2002) estimate, for individual goods, trade elasticities
of around 5 and higher. In the business cycle literature, the trade elasticity is typically taken to be lower.
Backus et al. (1995) use elasticities between 0 and 5, Chari et al. (2002) assume a value of 1.5. A number of
recent contributions have also emphasized the role of a low elasticity of intratemporal substitution (well in
the complementarity region) together with an incomplete ﬁnancial markets structure in the transmission of
productivity shocks across countries, in particular in addressing stylized facts on international relative prices
and the low degrees of international risk sharing observed in the data (see e.g., Heathcote & Perri (2002),
Corsetti et al. (2008), Thoenissen (2008), Enders & Mueller (2009)). In particular, as Corsetti et al. (2008)
show, the volatility of the terms of trade or the exchange rate becomes particularly high around a threshold
of the trade elasticity that is related to the degree of home bias and lies at 1− 1
2γ .20 For values of the trade
elasticity close to that threshold the terms of trade under incomplete ﬁnancial markets behave markedly dif-
ferent than under complete ﬁnancial markets, leading to low degrees of risk sharing. Thus, an analysis of the
effects of varying degrees of international risk sharing for optimal monetary policy should also speciﬁcally
consider this region of low elasticities.
20 Moreover, they show that for values of the trade elasticity below the threshold, theTOT appreciate in response to a home productivity increase which
leads to a decrease in foreign consumption (which is in line with empirical response for the case of the US), whereas above the threshold the TOT
depreciate and transmission to the other country is positive.
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5 Results
RAMSEY STEADY STATE
Section 2 has shown that the Ramsey equilibrium under the various ﬁnancial market assumption and under
coordination or Nash is obtained as the system of equations of ﬁrst order conditions derived from the appro-
priate Ramsey problem. To determine the long-run inﬂation rate associated to the optimal policy problems
above, one needs to solve the steady-state versions of the set of efﬁciency conditions. In all economies and
regimes considered, the steady state (gross) inﬂation rate associated to the optimal policy problem is found
to be equal to 1, as can be seen from the ﬁrst order condition with respect to πH,t and π∗
F,t.21 Hence the
Ramsey planner would like to generate an average (net) inﬂation rate of zero. The intuition for this result is
simple. Under commitment, the planner cannot systematically affect the economy through monetary sur-
prises and, thus, there is not a terms of trade externality as the one discussed in Corsetti & Pesenti (2001)
and Clarida et al. (2001). That is, the planner cannot on average resort to movements in inﬂation to alter
the relative purchasing power of its residents. The planner therefore aims at choosing a long-run inﬂation
rate that minimizes the cost of adjusting prices, which is summarized by the quadratic term. The openness
dimension of the desire of adjusting the terms of trade can, therefore, drive the planner’s behavior only in
the presence of equilibrium ﬂuctuations (as induced by country-speciﬁc shocks) around the same long-run
steady state.
TRANSMISSION UNDER FLEXIBLE VERSUS STICKY PRICES
To facilitate the analysis of optimal monetary policy, I ﬁrst examine a useful benchmark in which price ad-
justment is ﬂexible, and then describe the dynamics under sticky prices. In this ﬂexible price environment,
there is no scope for monetary policy. I study this case in detail however, as the ﬂexible price allocation is a
natural reference case, and I will, in the following, often relate the optimal monetary policy to such a bench-
mark. Under ﬂexible prices a productivity increase in the domestic economy leads to a higher abundance
of domestic goods. This translates into a decrease in the price of domestic goods resulting in a depreciation
of the domestic terms of trade, making domestic goods relatively cheaper and channeling world demand to-
wards domestic goods. Figure 1 shows the responses to the domestic productivity shock of major variables
for the three ﬁnancial market structures (CM, FA, and IM-Bond) and for the case where goods are either
substitutes (ω = 3), complements (ω = 0.7) or are unit-elastic (ω = 1).
Let’s focus ﬁrst on the case of goods being substitutes and consider the scenario of complete ﬁnancial markets.
The increase in domestic productivity leads to a domestic consumption increase, labor effort rises as the
home economy gets more productive and the terms of trade deteriorate. Enjoying a more favorable price and
because it is easy to substitute to the now more abundant domestic good the foreign country also beneﬁts
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from the domestic productivity shock. In particular, under complete markets, the terms of trade depreciate
just enough to equalize the marginal utility beneﬁt from the productivity shock in both countries, as dictated
by the risk sharing equation. In the other extreme case of ﬁnancial autarky, the response of the terms of trade
issomewhat less pronounced. While theterms of trade still depreciatesas an equilibrium responsetothe now
more abundant domestic goods, it does so to a much lesser extent than in the case where marginal utility had
to be equalized. As no state-contingent assets have been traded promising the Foreign country part of the
beneﬁts, Home labor effort does not increase, the expansion in domestic output is therefore lower than in
the complete markets case, and the fall in the price of domestic goods relative to foreign goods (that is, the
terms of trade deterioration) in turn less pronounced. When goods are substitutes the TOT and labor move
too little under incomplete ﬁnancial markets relative to CM.
The transmission of the productivity shock is somewhat different when goods are complements. Generally
speaking, a lower elasticity of substitution implies that for any given change in quantities, higher movements
in the price are necessary to bring about these movements in quantities. That is, under all ﬁnancial market
structures, the terms of trade responses are now much stronger than in the case where goods are substi-
tutes. In addition, the TOT now depreciates more in the case of incomplete ﬁnancial markets than under
complete markets. Because home and foreign goods are complementary in utility from consumption, the
(productivity-induced) higher abundance of domestic goods also leads to a higher demand for foreign goods.
If markets are complete the foreign country is therefore bound to expand its output by increasing its labor
effort which tends to take some of the pressure of the terms of trade increasing. Under ﬁnancial autarky
such an increase in foreign output is absent, as a result the increased demand for the foreign goods without a
counterbalancing increase in supply for it leads to a deterioration of the terms of trade that is even stronger.
The lower the trade elasticity, the stronger is the terms of trade depreciation, and the foreign country increas-
ingly beneﬁts from the domestic productivity increase. Summarizing, now, when goods are complements
the TOT move too much under incomplete markets relative to CM.
Finally, let’s turn to the case in which goods are unit-elastic. If the elasticity is unity then relative price
changes are completely offset by changes in output volumes. In this knife-edge case, the income effect of
the required terms of trade depreciation (given the relatively higher productivity in Home) balances the
incentive to switch expenditure towards Home goods: relative wealth is always unaffected in response to
country speciﬁc shocks and that complete risk sharing is always obtained independent of the ﬁnancial market
structure assumed.22
Under sticky prices, it is costly for ﬁrms to change their prices which as a result don’t adjust instantaneously.
As is well known in the literature, a policy of producer price targeting would, however, lead to an exact
replicationoftheﬂexiblepriceallocation. Ifproducerprices PH and P∗
F arerigid, thepolicymakercaninitiate
the necessary policy response — a decrease in the nominal interest rate — that boosts demand and depreciates
the home terms of trade, such that its response behaves as if there were ﬂexible prices. Home goods are then
cheaper relative to Foreign goods in both Home and the Foreign country. As demand shifts in favor of the
goods with the lowest relative price, world consumption of Home goods increases relative to consumption
of Foreign goods, that is, there is "expenditure switching". While the replication if the ﬂex-price allocation is
possible, the adjustment under sticky prices requires action on the part of the monetary policymaker. Also,
if it is the optimal monetary policy to exactly replicate the ﬂexible price allocation depends on the distortions
that characterize the economy. As described in section 3 it should be expected that open economy aspects
— the fact that countries have some degree of monopoly power over the terms of trade, and that the degree
of international risk sharing may be too low — will generally have an inﬂuence on the degree of optimal
stabilization that monetary policy should provide. The next sections studies these issues in detail.
22 Strictly speaking, the threshold where relative price changes are completely offset by changes in output volumes lies only at unity because of my
assumption of log-utility (that is a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, σ = 1). More generally this threshold depends on the intratemporal elasticity, the
intertemporal elasticity and the degree of home bias and is given by ω = (2γ −1+σ)/(2γσ).
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THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE TRADE ELASTICITY FOR
STABILIZATION
This section presents results on how the structure of international asset markets can change the way mon-
etary policy should be conducted and analyzes the implications of the terms of trade considerations under
these setups. Allowing for a non-unitary elasticity implies that terms-of-trade volatility becomes important
in the consideration for optimal policy. The desire of adjusting the terms of trade (or the real exchange rate)
is generally sufﬁcient to induce the planner to deviate from a policy of full stabilization. As outlined in sec-
tion 5 these considerations can drive the planner’s behavior only in the presence of equilibrium ﬂuctuations
around the long-run steady state that derive from country-speciﬁc shocks. Therefore, the "optimal policy"
is studied here in the sense of optimal stabilization in response to shocks. The shock considered throughout
this section is a 1% increase in domestic productivity.
Figure 2 studies the optimal producer price inﬂation responses on impact of a the productivity shock, that is,
it ignores the time dimension of the impulse response. These ﬁrst-period responses are depicted instead as a
function of the trade elasticity, which is given on the horizontal axis. The panels in the ﬁrst row of the ﬁgure
display the impact responses on a relatively small scale, which is useful to understand the pattern of inﬂation
responses around the threshold of the unit-elasticity. The same ﬁgure is then reproduced a second time in the
lower two panels, plotted on a larger scale, which turns out to be useful when studying the responses under
incomplete markets and low elasticities. The vertical line at ω = 0.33 refers to the asymptotic threshold of
1− 1
2γ at which the sign of transmission switches and at which the volatility of the terms of trade is inﬁnite,
as discussed in section 4. Figure 3 displays the impact behavior of the nominal interest rate. The optimal
impact responses of domestic and foreign producer price inﬂation are depicted over a large range of the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (ranging from very complementary goods to
very substitutable goods), and for the various scenarios of ﬁnancial markets. A central result, which becomes
immediately apparent upon inspecting Figure 2 is that, for all cases but the one of perfect risk sharing and
coordination, the implications are that deviations from full (producer) price stability are optimal. While,
independent of the ﬁnancial market assumption, a policy of keeping producer price inﬂation at zero would
replicate the ﬂexible price outcome, this is found to be the optimal policy only in the case of complete
markets and coordination, or in the special case of a unit elasticity and therefore automatic full risk sharing.
To better understand why this is the case I also study the responses of other variables of interest. Figures
4 and 5 therefore display the behavior of the terms of trade, the consumption and labor responses in the
domestic economy under the various scenarios, by looking at differences of the responses of these variables to
the responses that would occur in a ﬂexible price version.23
As discussed previously, in response to a 1% productivity increase in the domestic economy, the terms of
trade depreciate, channeling demand to the now more abundant domestic good, both under ﬂexible prices
or the sticky price optimal monetary policy economy. Figure 4 shows that in the case of complete ﬁnan-
cial markets under policy coordination the difference of the TOT response under optimal policy from the
response under ﬂexible prices is zero at all values of the trade elasticity. The TOT under CM and coordina-
tion responds exactly as in the ﬂexible price world. Also, under the special case of a unit-elasticity, ﬁnancial
market structure becomes unimportant as perfect risk sharing is automatically obtained over compensating
movements in the international relative price. For all other cases the responses of the sticky-price optimal
and the ﬂexible-price models differ: the terms of trade either appreciate (CM, Nash) or depreciate (FA, Nash
and Cooperation) relative to the ﬂexible price responses; as the monopoly power over the international relative
price and/ or imperfect degrees of risk sharing also exert an inﬂuence on the optimal degree of stabilization.
In particular, the mechanism behind these patterns is as follows: undercomplete markets, when risk sharing is
perfect and price stickiness is the only distortion in the economy, a coordinated policymaker that maximizes
23 Alternatively, for the case of FA or IM, one could also study the differences of the responses of these variables with respect to the ﬁrst best allocation.
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world welfare always ﬁnds it optimal to to replicate the ﬂexible price allocation (as seen by the ﬁrm black
line from Figure 2). However, when acting uncoordinated, the policymaker of each country fails to take into
account the effect of his policy choice on the other country’s welfare, and tries to make use of his monopoly
power over the TOT. As a result the home authority ﬁnds it optimal to follow a policy in which the TOT
vary somewhat less thanunder ﬂexible prices if goods are substitutes: in responseto the productivity increase
the TOT is less depreciated relative to a ﬂexible price outcome and producer price inﬂation is negative on
impact. As consumption risk is shared and domestic goods can easily be substituted by foreign goods, the
less pronounced TOT response aims at having to increase employment by a little less, which would be
increasing their welfare, as this is done with the prospect of keeping the same utility from consumption. In
a Nash equilibrium, however, this attempt is unsuccessful, as both policymakers have the incentive to let the
terms of trade (or the real exchange rate) ﬂuctuate less that what would be dictated by perfect risk sharing.
As a result the TOT do not move ’enough’, and while the uncoordinated planner succeeds in generating a
lower volatility of labor effort, consumption volatility increases, which worsens overall welfare.24
When goods are complements, the incentive for the home policymaker to contract the employment response
and push some of the work effort to the foreign economy is absent, as foreign goods consumption cannot
substitute consumption of domestic goods. On the contrary, the incentive is to render foreign goods even
cheaper. Asaresult, whengoodsarecomplements, producerpriceinﬂationispositivefollowingthedomestic
productivityincrease,andtheTOT ismoredepreciatedrelativetoitsﬂexiblepriceresponse. Onlyinthecase
of a unit elasticity of intratemporal substitution the economies are insular with respect to TOT movements
and the Nash outcome and coordination deliver the same result (of a prescription of price stability as the
optimal policy).
When turning to the scenario of ﬁnancial autarky, the Ramsey planner now has to take another distortion
into consideration in the design of its optimal policy as, in addition to nominal rigidities, the world is now
one with a too low degree of international risk sharing. Figure 2 shows that the TOT is found to be more
depreciated (compared to a ﬂexible price scenario) when goods are substitutes, and the inﬂation response is
positive. If a non-coordinated policymakers now were to reduce employment (volatility), this would still
beneﬁt agents by increasing the utility of leisure; unlike under complete markets, consumption risk is not
shared and consumption is much more closely tied to current output. As productivity is currently high it
pays off to increase output so much that the terms of trade depreciate even more than in the ﬂexible price
scenario. UndersubstituteslettingtheTOT ﬂuctuatemorerelativetotheﬂexiblepricebenchmarkimproves
risk sharing and pushes the TOT response somewhat closer towards how it would respond in a complete
markets-perfectrisk sharing world. The higherTOT volatilitythereforetranslatesintoa lowerconsumption
volatility which improves welfare relative to ﬂexible prices.
Only in the case where goods are complements domestic agents have an incentive to let their terms of trade
depreciate somewhat less (appreciate relative to a ﬂex price world) and to contract output relative to the
ﬂexible price outcome. As a result, the prescription of an optimal policy ﬂips again when crossing the area
from goods being substitutes into the complementarity region: in the latter case the TOT is found to be
more appreciated relative to the ﬂexible price response and producer price inﬂation decreases in response to
a productivity shock.
It is interesting to note, that under ﬁnancial autarky the optimal policy of both the coordinated and unco-
ordinated policymakers have the same qualitative implications of deviating from price stability. While even
an uncoordinated planner ﬁnds it optimal to ’do some risk sharing ’, a coordinated policymaker will ﬁnd it
optimal to depreciate the terms of trade even more when goods are complements, taking account of the fact
that production should take place in the more productive economy and that over a lower price of domes-
tic goods both economies beneﬁt (similarly, the coordinated planner will ﬁnd it optimal to appreciate the
terms of trade even more relative to the ﬂex price case when goods are substitutes). When studying ﬂexible
24 It should be stressed that the result documented is in terms of volatilities. In particular, for a negative productivity shock the optimal TOT response
under the optimal policy of an uncoordinated policymaker would be to generate a TOT appreciation that is less pronounced than under ﬂexible
prices. A policymaker under commitment cannot resort to ex-post terms of trade appreciation.
MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/5 23MNB WoRKINg PAPERS • 2010/5 25
RESUlTS
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
price impulse responses in section 5 under the various ﬁnancial market scenarios, the TOT under incom-
plete markets (ﬁnancial autarky or bond economy) was shown to depreciate too little (relative to the efﬁcient
economy with risk sharing) when goods are substitutes, but depreciate too much when goods are comple-
ments. A planner that, because of the presence of price rigidities, has some control over the terms of trade
(or the real exchange rate), will therefore ﬁnd it optimal to push it closer to the responses that would prevail
in the complete markets case, thereby obtaining some risk sharing through the relative price. Policymakers
under a sticky-price incomplete ﬁnancial markets can therefore improve over the ﬂex-price (but incomplete
markets) outcome.
Finally, in the incomplete markets-bond economy case, the optimal responses to a domestic productivity shock
lie, as should be expected, somewhere in between the cases of complete markets and ﬁnancial autarky. This
ﬁnding is not surprising, considering that the availability of the international bond allows for some consump-
tion smoothing. In turn, how easily the bond can be used in consumption smoothing depend crucially on the
parameter of the portfolio adjustment cost, ψ. As ψ becomes very large, the policy prescriptions will closely
follow the ones under ﬁnancial autarky, if ψ is very small the optimal policy in the bond economy will be
closer to the complete markets case. With the chosen value, it turns out that a policymaker under Nash
competition follows a policy that is closer to the full risk sharing case, while a coordinated policymaker’s
policy matches closer that under ﬁnancial autarky.
THE ROLE OF RISK SHARING FOR GAINS FROM POLICY COORDINATION AND GAINS
OVER THE FLEXIBLE PRICE ALLOCATION
The fact that the policy prescription under Nash competition generally differs from the policy prescription
under coordination implies that there are welfare gains from coordination. The welfare measures computed
are conditional welfare, measured in terms of consumption equivalents.25 While it should be noted that, as
the steady state level of inﬂation is non-distorted, welfare gains are found generally to be very small, Table
2 shows that these are found increasing for elasticities of substitution away from unity and typically by an
order of magnitude larger in the case of complementarity between domestic and foreign goods. Moreover,
comparing complete markets with ﬁnancial autarky welfare gains from coordination are typically larger
under complete markets as long as goods are substitutes, as documented also by Sutherland (2004). The
case is different, however, when domestic and foreign goods are complementary in consumption. When
goods are complements and the elasticity of substitution is very low, wealth effects from movements in the
international relative price become very large under ﬁnancial autarky. The relative price distortion, that
results in the too low degree of international risk sharing, becomes particularly important when the trade
elasticity is close to the threshold 1−1/2γ, as discussed earlier. As a result, a coordinated planner, attributes
a much higher importance to alleviating the relative price distortion, trying to improve international risk
sharing, and can achieve much larger welfare gains. It is of particular importance to include this region in
a study of the effects of the degree of international risk sharing on optimal monetary policy, as this is the
region of the trade elasticity which is able to reconcile the empirically observed lack of risk sharing with the
model. The conclusion is therefore, that when risk sharing is low, gains from a international coordination of
policies can be substantial.
25 That is, I compute the λ variation in consumption that makes welfare under the Nash policy equivalent to the welfare under coordination. Formally,
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Finally, the ﬁnding that even a coordinated policymaker ﬁnds it optimal not to replicate the ﬂexible price
equilibrium means that there are welfare gains over the ﬂexible price allocation whenever risk sharing is
incomplete. A planner under incomplete markets (ﬁnancial autarky or the bond economy) can improve
upon the ﬂexible price allocation by pushing the real exchange towards the case of perfect risk sharing. Table
3 computes the welfare gains of the various ﬁnancial market regimes over the ﬂexible price allocation, to
give an indication of the quantitative importance of this ﬁnding. Clearly, under complete markets Nash
competition leads to welfare losses over a ﬂexible price (efﬁcient) allocation. Interestingly, under ﬁnancial
autarky or the IM-bond economy even Nash policymakers, even though they choose an inefﬁcient level of
the terms of trade volatility, are able to achieve welfare gains over a ﬂexible price allocation.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section I perform some sensitivity analysis on the baseline parameter choice discussed in section 4.
Table 4 and 5 summarize the results of this analysis on the welfare gains from coordination and the welfare
gains over the ﬂexible price allocation, respectively. For the sake of saving space, Table 5 is limited to the
more interesting cases of FA and IM under coordination only. The ﬁndings can be summarized as follows.
Higher values of the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion tend to lead to higher welfare gains, both welfare
gains from coordination, and — under incomplete markets — for gains from deviation from price stability.
Moreover, deviating from the assumption of log-preferences implies that the threshold at which the optimal
policy coincide irrespective of ﬁnancial market structure moves to a lower value of the trade elasticity. In
particular, the relevant combination of both intra- and intertemporal substitution elasticities (and the degree
of home bias) lie at ω = (2γ −1+σ)/(2γσ), which for values σ = 2 and σ = 3 are at ω = 0.83 and ω = .78
respectively. Figure 7 summarizes this result graphically, by plotting the the differences of the TOT impact
responses from the ﬂexible price allocation for these cases.
As regards the parameter of the degree of home bias, I ﬁnd that for the case of substitutes lower values of
homebiasresultinhigherwelfaregains, consistentwithwithﬁndingofpreviouswork(e.g. Faia & Monacelli
(2004)). For the case of complementary goods, however, a higher degree of home bias leads to larger welfare
gains. Moreover, as summarized in Figure 8, the level of the asymptotic threshold at which the risk sharing
becomes increasingly worse under incomplete ﬁnancial markets shift.
For increasing values of κ compared to the baseline, which implies a lower labor supply elasticity, the welfare
gains generated by model are generally smaller welfare gains. This is because higher values of κ increase the
negative welfare effect of labor volatility and reduce the uncoordinated policymaker’s incentive to engage in
this form of policy.
Turning to the parameters on the production side, a higher persistence, ρ, or a higher standard deviation of
the productivity shock, σ￿, as well as higher price adjustment costs, α, all tend to increase welfare gains.
Finally, I also consider variations in the production subsidy, τ, contrasting the baseline case in which the
subsidy is fully offset with the case where the subsidy is zero and the monopolistic competition distortion
is present. In the latter case there is a motive for a policymaker to also address this distortion in response to
productivity shocks that hit the economy. In particular, while for goods being substitutes the presence of the
monopolistic competition distortion leads to a decrease in the achievable welfare gains — as the incentive to
push the economy towards the efﬁcient level of output in response to shocks runs counter to the incentive
to moving the terms of trade in one’s favor —, the case is again the opposite in the region of complementary
goods.
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6 Conclusion
The analysis of this paper has shown that the elasticity of intratemporal substitution and assumptions on the
international ﬁnancial market structure are important determinants of optimal monetary policy in the open
economy. In particular, a purely inward-looking policy of producer price stability is found to be optimal
only in the very special case in which ﬁnancial markets are complete and policymakers act coordinately, or
in the case of a unit trade elasticity which provides automatic perfect risk sharing. In all other cases it is
optimal for monetary policymaker to not only consider stabilizing internal prices but to consider also the
variability of international prices as the terms of trade (or the real exchange rate) in shaping their policy. In
all but the special case of the unit elasticity, there are gains from policy coordination to be achieved, which
become quite substantial when the trade elasticity is low and ﬁnancial markets are incomplete.
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Appendices
A Tables and Figures
Table 1
Model Parameters
discount factor β 0.99
elasticity between varieties θ 6
home bias γ,1−γ∗ 0.75
persistence of productivity shock ρ,ρ∗ 0.95
standard deviation of productivity shock σ￿,σ∗
￿ 0.01
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion σ 1
inverse of the elasticity of labor supply κ 2
Rotemberg price adjustment cost parameter α 60
Production subsidy offsetting monopolistic competition distortion τ 1/(θ−1)
Portfolio adjustment cost parameter ψ 0.00074
trade elasticity between H and F consumption goods ω ε [0.15,5]
Table 2
Welfare gains from monetary policy coordination, in percent of st.st. consumption
ω CM FA IM
0.15 1e-2* 0.0191 0.6892 0.9311
0.25 1e-2* 0.0106 7.5072 12.0912
0.45 1e-2* 0.0024 0.5393 2.2871
0.55 1e-2* 0.0016 0.0079 0.0819
0.65 1e-2* 0.0007 0.0014 0.0117
0.85 1e-2* 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004
1 1e-2* 0 0 0
1.5 1e-2* 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003
2 1e-2* 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004
3 1e-2* 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004
5 1e-2* 0.0009 0.0000 0.0004
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Table 3
Welfare gains from optimal policy over ﬂexible price allocation, in percent of st.st. consumption
policy coordination Nash policy
ω CM FA IM CM FA IM
0.15 1e-2* 0 1.8724 1.7174 -0.0191 1.1831 0.7861
0.25 1e-2* 0 18.9492 17.6112 -0.0106 11.4277 5.4986
0.45 1e-2* 0 1.3409 0.9617 -0.0024 0.8015 -1.3256
0.55 1e-2* 0 0.3427 0.2407 -0.0016 0.3348 0.1588
0.65 1e-2* 0 0.0521 0.0370 -0.0007 0.0507 0.0253
0.85 1e-2* 0 0.0015 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0013 0.0007
1 1e-2* 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 1e-2* 0 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0003
2 1e-2* 0 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0002
3 1e-2* 0 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0000 0.0003 0.0008
5 1e-2* 0 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0002
Table 4
Sensitivity analysis on welfare gains from coordination, in percent of st.st. consumption
ω CM FA IM
σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3
0.65 1e-2* 0.0007 0.0002 0.0012 0.0014 0.0023 0.0033 0.0117 0.0201 0.0306
1 1e-2* 0 0.0008 0.0014 0.0001 0.0015 0.0038 0.0004 0.0021 0.0053
2 1e-2* 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0008 0.0013 0.0004 0.0019 0.0027
γ= .6 γ= .75 γ= .9 γ= .6 γ= .75 γ= .9 γ= .6 γ= .75 γ= .9
0.65 1e-2* 0.0006 0.0007 0.0002 0.0004 0.0014 0.0042 0.0033 0.0117 0.0177
2 1e-2* 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003
κ= 1 κ= 2 κ= 3 κ= 1 κ= 2 κ= 3 κ= 1 κ= 2 κ= 3
0.65 1e-2* 0.0013 0.0007 0.0005 0.0050 0.0014 0.0005 0.0209 0.0117 0.0089
2 1e-2* 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004
ρ = .95 ρ= .99 ρ = .95 ρ= .99 ρ = .95 ρ= .99
0.65 1e-2* 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0013 0.0014 0.0016 0.0146 0.0117 0.0037
2 1e-2* 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002
σ￿= .005 σ￿= .01 σ￿= .1 σ￿= .005 σ￿= .01 σ￿= .1 σ￿= .005 σ￿= .01 σ￿= .1
0.65 1e-2* 0.0002 0.0007 0.0710 0.0004 0.0014 0.1436 0.0029 0.0117 1.1738
2 1e-2* 0.0000 0.0002 0.0154 0.0000 0.0001 0.0132 0.0001 0.0004 0.0441
τ= 1
θ−1 τ = 0 τ= 1
θ−1 τ = 0 τ= 1
θ−1 τ = 0
0.65 1e-2* 0.0007 0.0008 0.0014 0.0011 0.0117 0.0107
2 1e-2* 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004
α = 40 α = 60 α = 80 α = 40 α = 60 α = 80 α = 40 α = 60 α = 80
0.65 1e-2* 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016 0.0123 0.0117 0.0122
2 1e-2* 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004
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Table 5
Sensitivity analysis, welfare gains over ﬂexible prices, in percent of st.st. consumption
ω FA IM
σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3
0.65 1e-02* 0.0521 0.0606 0.0704 0.0370 0.0394 0.0421
1 1e-02* 0 0.0015 0.0038 0 0.0012 0.0028
2 1e-02* 0.0006 0.0014 0.0017 0.0006 0.0014 0.0014
γ = .6 γ = .75 γ = .9 γ = .6 γ = .75 γ = .9
0.65 1e-02* 0.0389 0.0521 0.0332 0.0331 0.0370 0.0107
2 1e-02* 0.0017 0.0006 0.0001 0.0017 0.0006 0.0001
κ = 1 κ = 2 κ = 3 κ = 1 κ = 2 κ = 3
0.65 1e-02* 0.0971 0.0521 0.0327 0.0723 0.0370 0.0227
2 1e-02* 0.0012 0.0006 0.0004 0.0013 0.0006 0.0004
ρ = .9 ρ = .95 ρ = .99 ρ = .9 ρ = .95 ρ = .99
0.65 1e-02* 0.0510 0.0521 0.0531 0.0237 0.0370 0.0531
2 1e-02* 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
σ￿= .005 σ￿= .01 σ￿= .1 σ￿= .005 σ￿= .01 σ￿= .1
0.65 1e-02* 0.0130 0.0521 5.2101 0.0093 0.0370 3.7044
2 1e-02* 0.0002 0.0006 0.0619 0.0002 0.0006 0.0623
τ = 1
θ−1 τ = 0 τ = 1
θ−1 τ = 0
0.65 1e-02* 0.0521 0.0564 0.0370 0.0408
2 1e-02* 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006
α = 40 α = 60 α = 80 α = 40 α = 60 α = 80
0.65 1e-02* 0.0392 0.0521 0.0630 0.0273 0.0370 0.0454
2 1e-02* 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008




Impulse responses to a domestic productivity shock under ﬂexible prices
low elasticity (ω = 0.7) unit elasticity (ω = 1) high elasticity (ω = 3)
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Figure 2
Impact responses of optimal domestic and foreign producer price inﬂation to a domestic 1 % productivity shock




















































































































































































1st row: small scale on the axis of the ordinate
2nd row: same ﬁgures as row one but plotted on a larger scale




Impact responses of optimal domestic and foreign nominal interest rates to a domestic 1 % productivity shock
























































































Differences of optimal TOT impact responses over ﬂexible price TOT impact responses (to a domestic 1 % productivity shock),
depending on the trade elasticity


































































































1st row: small scale on the axis of the ordinate
2nd row: same ﬁgures as row one but plotted on a larger scale
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Figure 5
Differences of optimal consumption impact responses over ﬂexible price impact responses (to a domestic 1 % productivity
shock), depending on the trade elasticity



































































































































































































1st row: small scale on the axis of the ordinate
2nd row: same ﬁgures as row one but plotted on a larger scale




Differences of optimal labor impact responses over ﬂexible price impact responses (to a domestic 1 % productivity shock),
depending on the trade elasticity


























































































































































































1st row: small scale on the axis of the ordinate
2nd row: same ﬁgures as row one but plotted on a larger scale
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Figure 7
Sensitivity analysis for σ: differences of optimal labor impact responses over ﬂexible price impact responses (to a domestic 1
% productivity shock), depending on the trade elasticity
σ = 2 σ = 3










































































































































































































1st row: small scale on the axis of the ordinate
2nd row: same ﬁgures as row one but plotted on a larger scale




Sensitivity analysis for γ: differences of optimal labor impact responses over ﬂexible price impact responses (to a domestic 1
% productivity shock), depending on the trade elasticity
γ = 0.6 γ = 0.9


































































































































































































1st row: small scale on the axis of the ordinate
2nd row: same ﬁgures as row one but plotted on a larger scale
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